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How fertility and union stability interact in shaping new family 
patterns in Italy and Spain 
Lucia Coppola1;2 
Mariachiara Di Cesare3 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between fertility decisions and union 
dissolution in Italy and Spain. We ask whether these processes affect each other directly 
and whether they are simultaneously influenced by the same unobserved characteristics. 
The analysis is based on the 1996 Fertility and Family Survey for Italy and Spain. 
Results show that the direct effect between processes is significant in both countries: as 
expected, childbearing decreases the risk of union dissolution, and union dissolution 
decreases the risk of further childbearing. Individual unobserved characteristics 
simultaneously shape both processes in Italy, where individuals who have a higher risk 
of having children also have a lower risk of dissolving their union (and vice versa). In 
contrast, this result does not hold in Spain.   
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1. Introduction  
In the framework of the Second Demographic Transition, Italy and Spain represent the 
so called “Mediterranean Model”. These two countries show peculiar demographic 
trends (Van de Kaa 1987) that differentiate them from their counterparts in Central and 
Northern Europe. In the Southern European countries, timing to first union formation 
and parenthood has dramatically increased, while marriage and fertility rates have 
decreased, at even lower levels than in other countries. In many Western countries 
cohabitation compensates the decline of marriages, and non-marital fertility and late age 
childbearing partly balance the decline in fertility. Yet, this is not the case in Italy and 
Spain (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000). On the one hand, these two countries are well-
known in Europe as champions for having achieved the “lowest-low” levels of fertility 
(Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002). On the other hand, union instability although 
increasing, is still at very low levels if compared with other European countries (De 
Rose and Di Cesare 2003; Solsona, Houle and Simo 1999). Italy and Spain are also 
similar in being characterized by very strong family ties, which often provide 
individuals with the social support not guaranteed by their weakened welfare states 
(Reher 1998).   
In this paper we focus on fertility decision and union instability. We argue that 
investigating these life trajectories together is worthwhile, because we expect that 
decisions about fertility and union instability are made according to same individual 
characteristics, possibly unobserved, belonging to one’s beliefs and values (Thornton 
1977; Lillard and Waite 1993). For instance, individuals who are more likely to have 
children may also be less likely to experience union dissolution, because they may be 
particularly willing to invest resources in the family (Jansen and Kalmijn 2002).  
Futhermore, fertility and union stability shape one’s family life-course through 
affecting each other directly. Childbearing may induce a lower risk of union dissolution 
(Willcox 1891; White 1990) by providing the couple with shared goals and interest 
(Thornton 1977), and by increasing the costs associated with an eventual union 
dissolution (Burges and Wallin 1953; Becker 1991). Similarly, union dissolution may 
decrease the chance of further childbearing, not only because non-marital fertility is 
very low (particularly in the case of Italy and Spain) (Council of Europe 2003; 2004), 
but also by reducing the confidence in the chances of future unions to last (Lillard and 
Waite 1993).  
To study union dissolution and fertility decision as interrelated processes, 
distinguishing between direct reciprocal effects and common determinants, we apply 
simultaneous hazard models (Lillard and Waite 1993). We compare two sets of models: 
one type considers the potential effect of unobserved common determinants and the 
other one disregards their effect. This strategy allows us to assess to what extent a 
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simultaneous modeling improves the comprehension of union dissolution and fertility 
decisions. The empirical analyses use data from the Family and Fertility Survey (FFS) 
for Italy and Spain.  
 
 
2. Union dissolution and fertility decision: common determinants 
and direct influence  
When two individuals enter a formal union, either a marriage or cohabitation, they 
share a decision-making process which influences the survival of the relationship itself, 
and the procreation during the relationship. Keeping a stable and satisfactory 
relationship, and having children, may represent two important goals for a union. The 
importance of each of these goals (or of both them) may be strongly determined by the 
individuals’ value orientation, attitudes and preferences (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000; 
Becker 1996).  
Values, attitudes, and preferences influence individuals’ selection of one specific 
life path, among many possible alternatives (Barber, Axinn and Thornton 2002; Jansen 
and Kalmijn 2002; Bumpass 2002). Individuals decide among several possible life 
trajectories coherently, according to their own values, to achieve their own specific 
goals (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000). For instance, individuals oriented towards family 
values are likely to decide about their employment, union, childbearing, and other 
careers consistently aiming to realize their family preferences: they may likely 
experience an early union formation (Baizan, Aassve and Billari 2003), and invest 
many resources to achieve a stable and satisfactory relationship, trying to avoid or 
postponing union breakdown as long as there is a chance to improve the relationship 
(Bumpass 2002). They may also be likely to experience an early childbearing (Baizan, 
Aassve and Billari. 2003), evaluating childbearing as a primary outcome of a union 
(Myers 1997; Jansen and Kalmijn 2002).  
Thus, we expect that union dissolution and fertility will be simultaneously 
determined by the same individual characteristics that generally influence one’s whole 
life-course. In this paper, we handle these characteristics as unobserved, and we 
interpret them in terms of value orientation. Our first research hypothesis then follows: 
 
H1: Individuals who are more likely to have children are also less likely to 
experience union dissolution (and vice versa). 
 
Decision making processes develop over time, and having already made a decision 
about one process may influence the opportunity-cost of decisions belonging to other 
processes. Therefore, the outcome of a life trajectory process may directly affect the 
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chance of experiencing an event characterizing another trajectory (Lesthaeghe and 
Moors 2000).  Thus, we expect not only fertility and union dissolution decisions to have 
common determinants, but also that the outcomes of these two processes may affect 
each other directly.  
On the one hand, having children may affect union stability. Children have been 
shown to have an impact upon stability in several ways. By increasing marital 
satisfaction, childbearing may promote union stability: children may provide the 
partners with shared goals and interests which are in turn translated into satisfaction and 
stability (Thornton 1977). The presence of children delays or prevents the break up of 
couples who are unhappily married (Thornton 1977). In this sense, the cost of children 
represents an obstacle to union dissolution (Becker 1991). Similarly, few children in the 
marriage may represent weak attractions within the marriage, low barrier forces, and 
strong attractions outside the marriage (Wineberg 1988; White 1987; Levinger 1965, 
1976). The birth order of children may also affect the couple relationship (Levinger 
1965, 1976; Thornton 1977; Becker 1991). Some authors show that a first child reduces 
divorce probability in the year following the birth (Waite and Lillard 1991; Waite, 
Haggstrom and Kanouse 1985; White and Booth 1985), while this effect is not visible 
for subsequent births. Thus, our second hypothesis follows: 
 
H2: Having children reduces the risk of union dissolution, and a stronger effect is 
associated with the first childbirth. 
 
On the other hand, union dissolution may affect the chance of having a further 
childbearing for each partner of the couple. Lillard and Waite (1993) have shown that 
the risk of union dissolution delays the transition into parenthood: since children 
represent a commitment for the marriage, couples that are more likely to split up, tend 
to avoid or postpone the decision of having a further child. Such an effect is expected to 
be even stronger once the union dissolution actually takes place. We assume that once a 
union ends, former partners are much less likely to have a child for two reasons. Firstly, 
singleness may reduce individual willingness to have a child (Lillard and Waite 1993). 
Secondly, having experienced a union disruption may reduce the chance and/or the 
desire to form a new commitment and the confidence in its stability, which in turn 
reduce the likelihood of childbearing (Lillard and Waite 1993).  Thus, our third 
hypothesis follows:  
 
H3: Experiencing union dissolution decreases the risk of further childbearing. 
 
It would be most appropriate to test these hypothesis using data on couples. 
Entering into a union (marriage or cohabitation), having children, and breaking a union 
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are decisions that do not belong to a single individual, but to both partners. Thus, 
considering the life-course of both partners would be necessary to achieve a full 
understanding of the life trajectories of interest. However, because of lack of 
information, we have to focus on one partner only. Furthermore, the Family and 
Fertility Survey does not provide information about former partners of individuals who 
have experienced a union dissolution. Ideally, we would like to investigate the process 
of interest separately for men and women, since this would provide an insight into 
potential gender differences. However, we choose to analyze women’s behavior only, 
because the Family and Fertility Survey provides an extremely restricted sample size 
for men, limiting the statistical power of our estimates and hampering our ability to 
reliably compare men and women.  
 
 
3. Union dissolution as a relatively new phenomenon in Italy and 
Spain  
In modern societies, marriage is a voluntary association between persons at which 
belong different costs of formation (Weiss and Willis 1993). From an economic point 
of view, the end of marriage has two different causes. Firstly, the relationship with a 
partner could be upset when one of the members meets a new potential partner who 
increases his or her utility. Secondly, many events may modify a marriage, leading both 
partners to break the union. The importance of these events depends on linked social 
problems. Union dissolution may produce change in economic conditions such that the 
needs of some family members may be insufficiently covered. The solidarity and 
internal redistribution that are typical of the traditional family may no longer function 
and new economic differences may arise among family members (Sgritta 1993). The 
negative consequences of a dissolution often affect women disproportionately, as in 
general their economic standing is more precarious than that of men (Giddens 1991). 
Rising divorce rates seem to be strongly related to changing gender systems and 
gender relations in society, such as the gradual elimination of gendered items in legal 
provisions and the growing tendency of women to take up paid employment (Lee 
1982).  
In Italy and Spain, marriage plays an important social role. Cohabitation is not as 
common as in other European countries, even when an increase in the proportion of 
cohabitations is appreciable (Sabbadini 1997; Tobio 2001). This is due to cultural 
factors as well as to the economic and social policies that favor marriage. However, 
union instability is not absent, and the slow but constant increase in total divorce rate is 
an indicator of changing family behavior (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Total divorce rate in some European countries – Years 1960-2003 
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Source: Council of Europe – Demographic Yearbook 2003 and 2004  
 
For understanding the timing of union dissolution, we take into account the role of 
several social and individual characteristics. Firstly, the historical period when a couple 
is experiencing a union is relevant. During the 1970s and the first part of the 1980s, 
Europe experienced important reforms in family law, like the introduction of the 
divorce and abortion laws. We considered that the process that started during the first 
years of the 1970s in Italy (1970 divorce law) and during the first years of the 1980s in 
Spain (1981 divorce law) generated important changes in family values. During the 
second half of the 1980s the divorce law got the form we know nowadays. Thus, we 
consider the second half of the 1980s as a proxy for changing historical and social 
context, likely to influence the timing of union dissolution. Another phenomenon 
related to the change in attitudes and values is the spreading of consensual unions. 
According to the literature, cohabitation has often been correlated to a higher 
probability of union dissolution (Bennett, Blanc and Bloom 1988; Booth and Johnson 
1988; White 1987). Possibly, people who choose cohabitation are less likely to accept 
normative marital behaviors, have lower commitment to marriage as an institution, and 
have more secularized values. Nevertheless, more recent studies show that this effect is 
becoming smaller, especially in countries where cohabitation is increasingly common 
(Kiernan, 2002). Teachman (2003) argues that cohabiting with a future spouse is 
becoming normative, and as a consequence this behavior might be less representative of 
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characteristics associated with a higher risk of union dissolution. We expect 
cohabitation to affect union instability in Italy in Spain, because this type of union still 
has a limited spread in these countries (Liefbroer and Dourleijn, 2006), and it was even 
less spread at the time when the FFS was carried out. We also consider parents union 
stability: parental separation is likely to lead the offspring to leave home earlier, to enter 
a union more quickly, to prefer cohabitation to marriage, and eventually to experience 
more unstable unions (Pope and Mueller 1976; Greenberg and Nay 1982; McLanahan 
and Bumpass 1988; Bumpass, Martin and Sweet 1991; Amato 1996). Among individual 
characteristics, we consider age at union formation: we expect that the younger the 
person is at the time of union formation, the higher the union instability, possibly 
because the decision to form a union in not thought enough (Morgan and Rindfuss 
1985; South and Spitze 1986; Thornton and Rodgers 1987; Martin and Bumpass 1989).  
We also consider the role of education on the couple’s stability: usually the likelihood 
of union disruption increases as individuals’ level of education increases (Blossfeld et 
al. 1995). However, recent studies (Raley and Bumpass, 2003) increasingly suggest that 
high educated women show lower levels of divorce compared to low educated women. 
According to Martin (2006) this pattern could be explained by a shift, in recent decades, 
in demographic trends regarding marriage and education, specifically marriage 
postponement among highly educated women (which decreases the risk of divorce) and 
high incidence of premarital births between low educated women (which increases the 
risk of divorce). Lastly, paid employment plays a relevant role in family dynamics 
(Bracher et al. 1993). We examine whether women’s involvement in the labor market is 
associated with a higher risk of marital instability (Booth et al. 1986; Rank 1987; Spitze 
and South 1985) paying a particular attention to the amount of hours worked weekly, a 
factor found to be positively correlated to union dissolution (Hill 1988; Spitze and 
South 1985). 
 
 
4. Fertility and the lowest-low levels reached in Italy and Spain 
Fertility is the result of a complex decision making process dealing with when and how 
many children an individual, or better a couple desires and can actually have. Much 
emphasis has been given to the trend of first childbearing postponement characterizing 
Western countries during the last decades (Van de Kaa 1987). This trend, in the context 
of the general postponement of the transition to adulthood, has been explained by an 
increasing emphasis in post-materialist needs, individual autonomy, self-realization, 
and well-being (Inglehart 1997). In addition, a prolonged educational process (Blossfeld 
and Huinink 1991; Coppola 2004), an increasingly unstable labor market and youth’s 
economic uncertainty (Oppenheimer 1988; Oppenheimer and Lew 1995), and the rising 
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participation of women in the labor force (Becker 1991), have contributed to delay the 
transition into parenthood.  
Italy and Spain have experienced an evident postponement of parenthood as well 
as a progressive reduction of total fertility. As a result, these countries have become 
champions in lowest-low fertility (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002). In these two 
countries fertility has declined across the years (Figure 2) and also between generations. 
These trends are partly explained by an extremely evident postponement of the 
transition to adulthood, and by the difficulties for new family habits to spread, as shown 
by the limited diffusion of cohabitation, and out of wedlock childbirths (Lesthaeghe and 
Moors 2000; Council of Europe 2003; 2004). As a consequence, young individuals 
enter marital unions later and less, and childbearing takes place later and less.  
 
Figure 2: Total fertility rate in some European countries – Years 1960-2003 
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Source:  Council of Europe – Demographic Yearbook 2003 and 2004  
 
Among the characteristics likely to influence fertility decisions we consider age, 
because younger cohorts are more likely to postpone their first child. But once the 
younger cohorts have had the first child, they are increasingly having a second or a third 
one, even if these births are postponed longer than before (Pinnelli, Hoffmann-Nowotny 
and Fux 2001). The rising of educational levels is considered one of the main causes of 
union formation postponement and, as a consequence, of childbearing postponement 
(Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Knudsen 1996; Di Giulio et al. 1999). Generally, the 
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attainment of a medium or high level of education is associated with a lower and later 
fertility. In particular, a medium level of education is more likely to have an impact on 
the quantum of fertility, leading more often to the decision of not having children at all. 
A high level of education is more likely to have an impact on timing of fertility, but it is 
less often an impediment to eventual childbearing (Pinnelli, Hoffmann-Nowotny and 
Fux 2001). Also women’s participation to labor market has an impact on fertility 
decisions, inducing women to have less children and later (Butz and Ward 1979; 
Lesthaeghe and Moors 1995; Kohler, Billari and Ortega. 2002). This is especially true 
in Italy and Spain, where the labor market is characterized by very similar patterns of 
employment for women and men which do not permit women to conciliate family and 
work (Angeli, De Rose and Di Cesare 2004). Conform to McDonald’s research (2000), 
fertility falls to very low levels when gender equity rises in individual oriented 
institution, like the labor market, but not in family oriented institutions. On the one 
hand, in Italy and Spain, employed women do not have many means to reconcile work 
with family commitments. On the other hand, family roles are taking longer than in 
other countries to adapt to women’s participation to labor market (Chesnais 1996). A 
highly asymmetric labor division within households is evident, and it becomes even 
more asymmetric after the first childbirth (Palomba and Sabbadini, 1993). In addition, 
the very low level of institutional and social support to family (Reher 1998) means that 
more often women have to choose between employment and maternity. 
Union characteristics are also likely to play a relevant role in determining the 
fertility process: marriages are expected to be associated with a higher fertility, 
compared to cohabitations. Particularly, the transformation of cohabitation into 
marriage has been found to have a positive effect on fertility (Pinnelli, Hoffmann-
Nowotny and Fux 2001).  
Finally, it is important to take into account some characteristics of the fertility 
process: the age at childbirth and the birth order. In Italy and Spain the probability of 
deciding not to have a child increases with age for all birth orders (Pinnelli, Hoffmann-
Nowotny and Fux 2001). Research has documented a negative association between the 
age at first birth and completed fertility (Bumpass and Mburugu 1977; Marini and 
Hodsdon 1981; Morgan and Rindfuss 1985; Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002). This 
negative association is true also because fecundity decreases with age from as early as 
25, and more rapidly from 35 onwards (Menken and Larsen 1994; Wood 1994; Beets 
1996), an age at which it has become increasingly common to form a family. Finally, 
researchers have found that the higher the birth order, the lower is the chance of having 
a further child (Pinnelli, Hoffmann-Nowotny and Fux 2001). 
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5. Data and methods  
The analysis is based on the 1996 Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) data for Italy and 
Spain. This survey was conducted in the 1990s in many member states of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe and was coordinated by the Population 
Activities Unit (PAU). The survey provides a (bigger) sample of women, a (smaller) 
sample of men, as well as a third sub-sample of the current partners of women. As we 
mentioned above, these data do not allow investigating timing to union dissolution and 
to childbearing as dynamics of the couple, and even the gender comparison is hampered 
by the sizable difference in the sample size of men and women4. Thus, we focus on 
women’s behavior. In particular, we select a sub-sample of women who have 
experienced the formation of a first union, so that we can analyze individuals 
simultaneously at risk of childbearing and union dissolution. The exclusion of women 
who have never experienced a marriage or a cohabitation is not expected to affect 
significantly the analysis of fertility, since out of wedlock childbearing is extremely rare 
in Italy and Spain. According to EUROSTAT, in 1996 the proportion of births outside 
marriage was 12% in Spain and 8% in Italy (as a contrast, for the same year, the 
proportion was 54% in Sweden). We consider first unions, either cohabitations or 
marriages, controlling for the effect of the union type on both processes under study. 
Time to union dissolution is defined as the month when partners stop living together.  
We have argued that union dissolution and fertility decisions may be 
simultaneously influenced by some common determinants, and may also influence each 
other directly. To test our hypotheses in the context of Italy and Spain, we use 
simultaneous hazard modeling (Lillard and Waite 1993). Each process is represented by 
a continuous hazard equation. To control explicitly for their mutual effect, the outcome 
of each process is used as an explanatory variable of the other process. The effect of 
unobserved characteristics on each process is represented by a heterogeneity term. By 
allowing for correlation between the two heterogeneity terms we control for the effect 
of potentially common unobserved determinants of both processes (Baizan, Aassve and 
Billari 2003; Coppola 2004). Formally the models can be presented as follows: 
 
ffff
f tDisstXtAtDth εααα +++++= )()()()()(ln 210
dd
d tFertYtDth εβββ ++++= )()()()(ln 210    (1) 
                                                          
4
 Italy shows the smallest men’s sample size (642 individuals), and only 59 union dissolutions. In the case of 
women, instead, Italy has 203 events of union dissolution. We expect that in the case of Italian men, the 
estimates may not be comparable with those achieved on the women sample, because the difference in sample 
size may affect the standard errors, and the statistical significance of the estimates. For sake of comparability 
we prefer to focus on women only in both countries.  
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where )(th f is the hazard rate of experiencing a further childbearing; )(tD f  is the spline 
(with knots at 12, 24 and 36 months) representing the duration of exposure to the risk of 
having a child since the union formation (for the first parity) or since the previous 
childbirth (for the following parities); )(tA f is the spline (with knots at 23 and 28 years) 
representing the woman’s age at the event; )(tX is the set of time constant or time 
varying explanatory variables we include in the model: cohort, educational level, 
employment, birth order and marriage; )(tDiss f is the time varying variable indicating 
whether the union dissolution occurs (through this variable we control for the direct 
effect of the other process); fε  is the heterogeneity term representing the effect of the 
unobserved characteristics on the process. Similarly, )(thd is the hazard rate of 
experiencing union dissolution; )(tDd is the spline (with knots at 38, 84, and 180 
months) representing the duration of exposure to the risk of union dissolution since the 
first union formation; )(tY  is the set of explanatory variables we include in the model: 
age at first union, educational level, employment, marriage, historical period, parents’ 
separation; )(tFer is the time varying variable indicating whether and how many 
children the woman has at each month; dε  is the heterogeneity term. 
Allowing for correlation between the heterogeneity terms ( ρ ) is crucial to control 
for the (potentially) simultaneous effect of the unobserved characteristics on both 
processes. The error terms are assumed to be time constant and distributed according to 
a bivariate normal distribution as follows: 
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The models are estimated with maximum likelihood, using the aML software package 
(Lillard and Panis 2000). 
 
 
6. Results 
Tables 1 and 2 show the estimates of three different models. The first model estimates 
an equation for each process, without the heterogeneity terms. The second model 
includes an heterogeneity term in each separate equation. Finally, we estimate the two 
equations simultaneously, allowing for the correlation between the two hetrogeneity 
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terms.5 We show estimates of the three models to better examine if and how much using 
simultaneous modeling improves our understanding of the interrelationship between 
fertility and union dissolution in Italy and Spain.  
 
 
6.1 Unobserved determinants of fertility and union dissolution 
The estimates obtained through the simultaneous approach are shown in the column 
named Model 3, in Table 1 for Italy and Table 2 for Spain. We discuss the estimates of 
the simultaneous modeling and compare them to the estimates of the model that 
excludes the heterogeneity terms (Model 1), and to the model that includes the 
heterogeneity terms but excludes the correlation between them (Model 2). Whether 
there exists common unobserved characteristics affecting union dissolution and fertility 
is indicated by the estimate of the correlation between the heterogeneity terms ( ρ ). In 
the case of Italy, results show there is a negative and statistically significant correlation 
between unobserved factors affecting union dissolution and those affecting fertility. In 
Spain, instead, this correlation is still negative but much smaller and not statistically 
significant. Thus, our first hypothesis (H1) finds empirical support in Italy but not in 
Spain. In Italy, individuals who are more likely to experience union dissolution are less 
likely to have a further child, and vice versa. In Spain, the risk of having a further child 
and that of experiencing a union dissolution do not depend on common unobserved 
determinants, once the effect of observed and unobserved explanatory variables is taken 
into account. Thus, in the case of Italy the use of simultaneous modeling improves the 
description of fertility and union dissolution and of their interrelationship. In the case of 
Spain, instead, this modeling approach does not provide any further information 
compared to the model that excludes the correlation between the error terms (Model 2). 
As a consequence, the estimates of the direct effect of each process on the other are also 
different when using simultaneous modeling in Italy, but similar when using different 
approaches in Spain.  
 
                                                          
5
 When estimating the simultaneous model, the variance of the heterogeneity term of union dissolution Error! 
Objects cannot be created from editing field codes. is fixed. Since fixing different levels of variance we 
found that there is not a significant impact on the parameter estimates, we prefer to set such a value at the 
same level obtained when modelling the union dissolution process alone. 
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Table 1: Parameter estimates for Italy: β, standard error, and significance 
 
Model 1 
 (Without heterogeneity) 
Model 2 
 (With heterogeneity) 
Model 3 
 (With correlation) 
 B SE  B SE  B SE  
Union stability 
Union duration: spline (months) 
         
0-36 months 0.0139 0.0108  0.0175 0.0120  0.0118 0.0113  
36-84 months 0.0002 0.0067  0.0016 0.0069  -0.0021 0.0071  
84-180 months 0.0078 0.0033 ** 0.0082 0.0035 ** 0.0069 0.0034 ** 
180+ months -0.0098 0.0043 ** -0.0096 0.0044 ** -0.0099 0.0044 ** 
Constant -8.1406 0.3403 *** -8.5621 0.6605 *** -8.6902 0.3555 *** 
Age at  first union (<20) 
         
20-22 years -0.4667 0.1852 ** -0.4784 0.2012 ** -0.4896 0.1966 ** 
23-25 years -0.7269 0.2066 *** -0.7643 0.2262 *** -0.7420 0.2218 *** 
>=26 years -1.0668 0.2642 *** -1.1275 0.2971 *** -1.1051 0.2850 *** 
Parents separation (No) 
         
Yes, <18 years 1.3072 0.2712 *** 1.4101 0.3336 *** 1.3876 0.2998 *** 
Yes, >=18 years 0.0549 0.7343  0.0680 0.7482  0.0387 0.7492  
Education (Low level) 
         
Medium level 0.3564 0.1686 ** 0.3830 0.1810 ** 0.4255 0.1817 ** 
High level 0.9360 0.2606 *** 0.9639 0.2976 *** 0.9942 0.2863 *** 
Type of union (Marriage) 
         
Cohabitation 1.9149 0.2233 *** 2.0460 0.2879 *** 2.1500 0.2553 *** 
Childbearing (Parity 0) 
         
Parity 1 -0.6753 0.2018 *** -0.7199 0.2140 *** -0.3845 0.2663  
Parity 2 -1.2925 0.2600 *** -1.3954 0.2941 *** -0.7863 0.4368 * 
Parity 3 -1.9798 0.4381 *** -2.0905 0.4638 *** -1.2557 0.6220 ** 
Employment (Housewife + Others) 
        
Employed <35 hours 0.4211 0.2843  0.4135 0.2957  0.4629 0.2952  
Employed 35-44 hours 0.4662 0.1893 ** 0.4777 0.1963 ** 0.5401 0.1962 *** 
Employed 45+ hours 0.8116 0.2168 *** 0.8198 0.2286 *** 0.8712 0.2298 *** 
Self-employed -0.0399 0.3375  0.0098 0.3536  0.0757 0.3532  
Period (until 1987) 
         
After 1988 0.4366 0.1640 *** 0.4567 0.1714 *** 0.4814 0.1705 *** 
Fertility 
Time since last birth: spline (months) 
      
<12 months 0.1878 0.0091 *** 0.2184 0.0091 *** 0.2184 0.0092 *** 
12-24 months -0.0324 0.0052 *** -0.0073 0.0055  -0.0071 0.0055  
24-36 months 0.0199 0.0045 *** 0.0384 0.0048 *** 0.0383 0.0048 *** 
>36 months -0.0172 0.0007 *** -0.0138 0.0008 *** -0.0139 0.0008 *** 
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Table 1: (continued)  
 
Model 1 
 (Without heterogeneity) 
Model 2 
 (With heterogeneity) 
Model 3 
 (With correlation) 
 B SE  B SE  B SE  
Age: spline (years) 
         
<23 years -0.0477 0.0071 *** -0.0483 0.0108 *** -0.0464 0.0107 *** 
23-28 years -0.0596 0.0097 *** -0.0447 0.0125 *** -0.0458 0.0124 *** 
>28 years -0.0738 0.0128 *** -0.0672 0.0146 *** -0.0670 0.0146 *** 
Constant -4.5334 0.1887 *** -5.1002 0.2601 *** -5.1628 0.2593 *** 
Cohort (45-50) 
         
1951-1955 -0.0424 0.0325  -0.0659 0.0600  -0.0560 0.0599  
1956-1960 -0.1313 0.0351 *** -0.2101 0.0631 *** -0.2051 0.0630 *** 
1961-1965 -0.1891 0.0379 *** -0.2925 0.0652 *** -0.2882 0.0650 *** 
1966-1970 -0.3393 0.0535 *** -0.4826 0.0807 *** -0.4804 0.0804 *** 
1971-1977 -0.3970 0.1177 *** -0.5064 0.1597 *** -0.4954 0.1596 *** 
Education (Low level) 
         
Medium level -0.1600 0.0299 *** -0.2927 0.0500 *** -0.2949 0.0500 *** 
High level -0.0432 0.0519  -0.1974 0.0847 ** -0.1990 0.0847 ** 
Employment (Housewife + Others) 
    
Employed <35 hours -0.3686 0.0639 *** -0.5254 0.0866 *** -0.5206 0.0865 *** 
Employed 35-44 hours -0.5252 0.0340 *** -0.6777 0.0479 *** -0.6784 0.0478 *** 
Employed 45+ hours -0.3648 0.0466 *** -0.5078 0.0673 *** -0.5063 0.0671 *** 
Self-employed -0.4562 0.0673 *** -0.6170 0.0921 *** -0.6199 0.0923 *** 
Childbearing (Parity 0) 
         
Parity 1 -1.0868 0.0344 *** -1.7060 0.0506 *** -1.7088 0.0507 *** 
Parity 2 -2.1586 0.0520 *** -3.2065 0.0753 *** -3.2084 0.0753 *** 
Parity 3 -2.2183 0.0720 *** -3.7979 0.1048 *** -3.7997 0.1046 *** 
Union dissolution (No) 
         
Yes -0.7598 0.1359 *** -0.8495 0.1581 *** -0.6375 0.1845 *** 
Type of union (Cohabitation) 
         
Marriage 0.9085 0.1009 *** 1.3101 0.1192 *** 1.3252 0.1193 *** 
          
Heterogeneity term for fertility εf   0.8281 0.0312 *** 0.8296 0.0312 *** 
Heterogeneity term for union dissolution εd   0.8077 0.5573  0.8077 
Correlation σ 
      -0.4564 0.2416 * 
 
Significance: (*) p<0.1; (**) p<0.05; (***) p<0.01 
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Table 2: Model estimates for Spain: β, standard error, and significance 
 
Model 1  
(Without Heterogeneity) 
Model 2  
(With Heterogeneity) 
Model 3  
(With Correlation) 
 B SE  B SE  B SE  
Union stability 
Union duration: spline (months) 
         
0-36 months 0.0287 0.0095 *** 0.0382 0.0128 *** 0.0370 0.0102 *** 
36-84 months 0.0043 0.0057  0.0090 0.0067  0.0080 0.0062  
84-180 months -0.0075 0.0038 ** -0.0069 0.0039 * -0.0073 0.0039 * 
180+ months 0.0060 0.0039  0.0063 0.0040  0.0062 0.0040  
Constant -8.3753 0.3279 *** -9.1425 0.7170 *** -9.1809 0.3611 *** 
Age at  first union (<20) 
         
20-22 years -0.6321 0.1749 *** -0.8013 0.2214 *** -0.8071 0.2051 *** 
23-25 years -0.7576 0.1982 *** -0.9499 0.2490 *** -0.9503 0.2287 *** 
>=26 years -0.6159 0.2374 *** -0.7983 0.2833 *** -0.7973 0.2786 *** 
Parents separation (No) 
         
Yes, <18 years 0.5216 0.2849 * 0.6025 0.3470 * 0.6035 0.3408 * 
Yes, >=18 years 0.7826 0.4425 * 0.7639 0.5275  0.7643 0.5332  
Education (Low level) 
         
Medium level 0.4709 0.1657 *** 0.5754 0.2089 *** 0.5794 0.198 *** 
High level 0.3951 0.2609  0.4926 0.3159  0.5058 0.3135  
Type of Union (Marriage) 
         
Cohabitation 2.3451 0.1881 *** 2.6905 0.3117 *** 2.7249 0.2321 *** 
Childbearing (Parity 0) 
         
Parity 1 -0.2312 0.2019  -0.3335 0.2252  -0.2541 0.2606  
Parity 2 -0.9454 0.2676 *** -1.1380 0.3070 *** -0.9976 0.3574 ** 
Parity 3 -0.3929 0.3206  -0.6201 0.3670 * -0.4245 0.4993  
Employment (Housewife + Others) 
        
Employed <35 hours 0.5198 0.2368 ** 0.5665 0.2675 ** 0.5840 0.2667 ** 
Employed 35-44 hours 0.4143 0.1731 ** 0.4173 0.1867 ** 0.4383 0.1884 ** 
Employed 45+ hours 0.6809 0.2250 *** 0.6318 0.2454 ** 0.6488 0.2471 *** 
Self-Employed 0.5824 0.4304  0.4745 0.4655  0.4783 0.4664  
Period (until 1987) 
         
After 1988 0.2570 0.1561 * 0.2691 0.1717  0.2805 0.1707  
Fertility 
Time since last birth: spline (months) 
 
  
 
  
 
 
<12 months 0.1948 0.0099 *** 0.2174 0.0100 *** 0.2174 0.0100 *** 
12-24 months -0.0272 0.0054 *** -0.0074 0.0056  -0.0074 0.0056  
24-36 months 0.0255 0.0047 *** 0.0397 0.0049 *** 0.0397 0.0049 *** 
>36 months -0.0163 0.0008 *** -0.0124 0.0008 *** -0.0124 0.0008 *** 
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Table 2: (continued)  
 
Model 1  
(Without Heterogeneity) 
Model 2  
(With Heterogeneity) 
Model 3  
(With Correlation) 
 B SE  B SE  B SE  
Age at childbirth: spline (years) 
         
<23 years -0.0372 0.0081 *** -0.0329 0.0109 *** -0.0331 0.0109 *** 
23-28 years -0.0566 0.0098 *** -0.0472 0.0122 *** -0.0472 0.0122 *** 
>28 years -0.1471 0.0144 *** -0.1403 0.0158 *** -0.1405 0.0158 *** 
Constant -4.9943 0.2117 *** -5.4947 0.2779 *** -5.4965 0.2776 *** 
Cohort (45-50) 
         
1951-1955 -0.1941 0.0351 *** -0.2355 0.0665 *** -0.2337 0.0665 *** 
1956-1960 -0.2593 0.0366 *** -0.3129 0.0659 *** -0.3113 0.0658 *** 
1961-1965 -0.4435 0.041 *** -0.5864 0.0687 *** -0.5858 0.0687 *** 
1966-1970 -0.7103 0.0558 *** -0.8900 0.0837 *** -0.8895 0.0838 *** 
1971-1977 -0.2925 0.1025 *** -0.3477 0.1386 ** -0.3465 0.1385 ** 
Education (Low level) 
         
Medium level -0.0952 0.0373 ** -0.1798 0.0580 *** -0.1813 0.0581 *** 
High level -0.1258 0.0673 * -0.2742 0.1017 *** -0.2749 0.1017 *** 
Employment (Housewife + Others) 
        
Employed <35 hours -0.5913 0.0690 *** -0.7846 0.0850 *** -0.7851 0.0850 *** 
Employed 35-44 hours -0.5405 0.0373 *** -0.7259 0.0488 *** -0.7255 0.0488 *** 
Employed 45+ hours -0.6699 0.0583 *** -0.8346 0.0732 *** -0.8346 0.0731 *** 
Self-employed -0.4449 0.0990 *** -0.5501 0.1243 *** -0.5490 0.1243 *** 
Childbearing (Parity 0) 
         
Parity 1 -1.0280 0.0364 *** -1.5191 0.0472 *** -1.5188 0.0472 *** 
Parity 2 -2.0560 0.0524 *** -2.8839 0.0699 *** -2.8836 0.0699 *** 
Parity 3 -1.8782 0.0632 *** -3.1111 0.0847 *** -3.1105 0.0849 *** 
Union dissolution (No) 
         
Yes -0.4001 0.1122 *** -0.4204 0.1280 *** -0.3706 0.1477 ** 
Type of union (Cohabitation) 
         
Marriage 1.2469 0.0912 *** 1.5793 0.1099 *** 1.5853 0.1104 *** 
          
Heterogeneity term for fertility εf 0.7143 0.0281 *** 0.7143 0.0282 *** 
Heterogeneity term for union dissolution εd  1.0927 0.3921 *** 1.0927   
Correlation σ 
      -0.0989 0.1629  
 
Significance: (*) p<0.1; (**) p<0.05; (***) p<0.01 
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Regarding the effect of fertility on union dissolution in Italy, we notice that having 
a further child significantly decreases the risk of union dissolution when the effect of 
unobserved characteristics is disregarded (see Model 1 and 2), but the same effect is 
much smaller and less significant when simultaneous modeling is used (see Model 3). 
Indeed, when using the simultaneous approach, only the second or higher parities are 
associated with a statistically significant lower risk of union disruption. Thus, not only 
having a child induces a lower risk of union dissolution: union dissolution is also 
influenced by unobserved characteristics that simultaneously induce women to have a 
higher fertility and a higher union stability. In Spain, fertility induces a significantly 
lower risk of union dissolution only in the case of the second birth order, independently 
on the modeling approach used. In sum, our second hypothesis (H2) is partially 
confirmed: fertility induces a lower risk of union dissolution, but this effect is lower 
than expected. Moreover, while union dissolution decreases with parity in Italy, this is 
not the case in Spain. The stronger effect on union dissolution does not stem from the 
first parity as we expected. 
With regard to the effect of union dissolution on fertility, in both countries a union 
breakdown induces a significantly lower risk of having a further child. Thus, our third 
hypothesis (H3) is confirmed in both countries. As we hypothesized when the 
simultaneous approach is used the direct effect of union dissolution on fertility is 
slightly lower in the case of Italy.  
The next two sections examine timing to union dissolution and to childbearing.  
 
 
6.2 Union dissolution 
Duration of the union: results show the risk of union dissolution does not have a well-
defined shape. In Spain, a higher risk is visible in the first years of the union and the 
risk of dissolution decreases after the 7th year of the union. In Italy the risk increases 
significantly between the 7th and the 15th year of union and decreases after the 15th year. 
However, in both countries the effect of duration is very small. 
Age at union formation: in both countries, this variable plays an important role in 
determining union stability. Women who were 19 or less when forming a union have a 
higher risk of ending their union than women aged 20 or more at union formation. The 
general trend in both countries is that as the age at union formation increases, the risk of 
union dissolution decreases. However, the decrease in risk is more pronounced for 
relatively young ages.  
Parents’ separation: parents’ separation is associated with a higher risk of 
instability, a finding that is consistent with the relevant role parents play in influencing 
their children’s behavior. It is also possible that the experience of parental separation 
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affects the value and the meaning individuals attribute to partnership. Children’s age at 
their parents’ separation also has an impact on their union stability. Experiencing 
parental union disruption during childhood strongly and significantly increases the risk 
of union disruption. Such an effect becomes non significant if parents’ separation 
occurs when the individual has already become an adult (more than 18 years old). 
Education: in both countries, there is a significant effect of education on the risk of 
union dissolution. In Italy, a higher level of education among women is associated with 
a higher risk of union dissolution. In Spain a medium level of education is associated 
with a higher risk of union dissolution. It seems that at least in Italy the traditional 
relation between women’s education and risk of divorce still holds. 
Type of union: to pick up the effect of cohabitation, we considered marriage as a 
reference category. We find that cohabiting couples have a much higher risk of 
experiencing union dissolution than married couples, and this effect is statistically 
significant in both countries. It is worth mentioning that cohabitation is not legally 
recognized in Italy or Spain. Cohabiters do not have mutual rights and duties and either 
party may consider ending the relationship at any time. Possibly partners prefer a 
cohabitation when they do not feel a strong commitment or when they desire to test 
their relationship before getting married.  
Employment: employed women have a higher risk of union disruption compared to 
unemployed women and housewives. Among employed women, those who work more 
than 45 hours a week experience a much higher risk of union dissolution. This result 
holds in both countries, and in Italy the difference between working 45 hours or more 
and other categories of work hours is even wider. Possibly women who invest much of 
their time in a job face more difficulties in integrating family and work activities and in 
carrying on a stable relationship.  
Period: the process of secularization is associated with an increase in union 
instability, but such an effect appears to be stronger in Italy. This is probably due to the 
fact that in Italy divorce was legalized earlier than in Spain.  
 
 
6.3 Fertility 
Duration: Italy and Spain display a similar pattern in the risk of having a child. While 
in the case of the first parity, duration reflects the time elapsed since the beginning of 
the union, for any subsequent parity duration reflects the time elapsed since the 
previous child’s birth. The risk of fertility rises during the first year, decreases during 
the second year, rises again during the third year, and decreases after that. In both 
countries, in the simultaneous modeling approach (Model 3), the decrease during the 
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second year loses statistical significance, and, as result, the overall pattern shows a 
reverse U shape with a knot at the end of the third year.  
Age at childbirth: the higher the age at childbirth, the lower the risk of having a 
further child. Such a trend is statistically significant and strong in both countries, 
indicating that late childbearing is consequential for women’s total fertility.  
Cohort: as expected, the younger the cohort, the lower the risk of a further 
childbearing in both countries. The youngest Spanish cohort represents an exception to 
this trend. In fact, the negative effect of this youngest cohort is weaker than that of the 
previous cohorts and it is quite similar to that of the 1956-60 cohort. This is probably 
due to a change in attitudes among the youngest generations. When controlling for the 
effect of unobserved characteristics (model 2 and 3), the decrease in the risk of having a 
further childbirth by cohort is even more evident. Possibly, once we control for 
unobserved characteristcs, the effect of reducing fertility as a result of inter-cohort 
changes in culture, values, and socioeconomic context appears more clearly. 
Education: as expected, education affects the risk of a further childbirth. In Italy, 
having a medium level of education is associated with a lower fertility more strongly 
than having a high level of education. Higher educational levels may be associated with 
other individual characteristics and resources that ease women’s integration of family 
and non family-related roles (i.e. higher economic resources, more flexible position in 
the labor market). This is not the case in Spain, where the higher the educational level, 
the lower the chance of a having a further child.  
Employment: when the number of working hours per week increases, the 
probability of having a further child decreases. Only in Italy, a slight recovery for 
women who work for more than 45 hours is visible. It is possible that these women 
have access to additional financial resources to afford the services they need to 
conciliate employment and fertility. The main difference between the two countries is 
represented by the category of self-employed workers: while in Italy these workers have 
the lowest probability of having a subsequent child, in Spain self-employed women 
have the second highest probability of having a further child, immediately following 
housewives. This could be due to country differences in the composition of the category 
of self-employment. Self-employment in Spain may allow for a higher flexibility and in 
turn for an easier conciliation of employment and fertility.  
Parity: in both countries, the higher the parity, the lower the risk to have a further 
child. Women in union seem to aim at having at least one child, but not necessarily 
more than one.  
Type of union: married women have a much higher risk of having a further child 
than cohabiting women do, and this is true in both countries. Such a result confirms that 
in Italy and Spain fertility is a phenomenon mainly associated with a traditional family 
structure, and with high levels of formalized commitment.  
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7. Conclusions 
We have argued that fertility and union dissolution are two deeply interrelated 
trajectories (Lillard and Waite 1993). Both decisions are relevant in defining 
individuals’ family related life course. Having one or more children and having a stable 
and satisfying relationship are indeed two of the main goals an individual has once 
entering a union, either a cohabitation or a marriage. We have also argued that there 
may be some unobserved characteristics that simultaneously affect the decision to have 
a further child and the decision to end a relationship (Lillard and Waite 1993; Thornton 
1977). We proposed an interpretation of these unobserved characteristics in terms of 
individuals’ value orientation. This interpretation states that the values of individuals 
influence, at least partially, the decisions they make about their life trajectories (Jansen 
and Kalmijn 2002). Individuals who are oriented towards family values are likely to 
invest more resources in the family (Jansen and Kalmijn 2002), and we expect that they 
may be more willing to attain higher fertility and to stay in longer lasting unions.  
Our arguments hold in Italy where, once we account for unobserved characteristics 
that simultaneously affect fertility and union dissolution, women who are more likely to 
have a further child are also less likely to experience union dissolution. In the case of 
Spain, instead, considering the correlation between unobserved factors for each event 
does not alter the results, once we control for the direct effect between union dissolution 
and fertility, and for other individual characteristics. We think this result implies that 
value orientation does not influence fertility and union dissolution in Spain, but rather 
that once the effect of individual characteristics and life trajectories are explicitly 
considered, the unobserved factors affecting one event are different from those affecting 
the other event. Previous research on union dissolution in Italy and Spain (De Rose and 
Di Cesare 2007) suggests not only that this event is less spread in Italy than in Spain, 
but also that it is more frequently experienced by individuals of better socio-economic 
conditions in Italy, while it is less dependent on social status in Spain. We may also 
argue that unobserved factors that affect union dissolution are different in the two 
countries, such that these unobserved characteristics are correlated with fertility in Italy, 
but not in Spain. Possibly, a lower acceptance of union dissolution in Italy induces 
individuals to more strictly interrelate their decisions regarding fertility and union 
dissolution. Thus, in the case of Italy, considering the direct effect between fertility and 
union dissolution does not provide a sufficient explanation of these events.  
Nevertheless, as we hypothesized, in both countries there is a direct effect between 
fertility decisions and union dissolution. On the one hand, having a child decreases the 
risk of union disruption, even if such effect is lower than expected. Thus, children 
represent a strong tie for the couple, providing shared goals and interests to the partners 
(Thornton 1977), as well as an economic obstacle to union dissolution (Becker 1991). 
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On the other hand, union dissolution strongly decreases the risk of further childbearing. 
A union breakdown represents an obstacle to further fertility, either by removing for 
some time the natural environment to having children, or by potentially reducing 
individuals’ confidence in the stability of the subsequent relationship, which in turn 
decreases the chance of having further children (Lillard and Waite 1993).  
Italy and Spain are usually considered very similar countries not only because of 
the demographic patterns they have experienced (Van de Kaa 1987), but also for the 
welfare states they rely on, and for the roles played by different institutions (Esping-
Andersen 1999). Among these institutions, for instance, the family is fundamental in 
both countries: through solid ties, the family provides strong support to individuals 
when facing transitions and important life decisions (Reher 1998). For these reasons, 
when investigating demographic processes in these countries, researchers have usually 
expected similar findings. In our case, the similarity between Italy and Spain is partially 
confirmed, because union dissolution and fertility are affected by individual 
characteristics and by each other in the same manner. However, unobserved 
characteristics play a different role in the two countries. This difference may refer to a 
distinction that, even if it is smaller when compared to other Western countries, it still 
holds in these two countries comparison. It would be useful to carry out further research 
that focuses on the differences between these countries rather than on their similarities. 
Understanding what generates this difference in contexts that are similar may provide a 
better insight into fertility and union dissolution decisions. Moreover, considering 
household and couple characteristics would allow a better comprehension on these 
dynamics, where certainly the couple more than the individual provide the appropriate 
unit of analysis (Olah, 2001). 
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